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Ignition Interlock Laws and DUI Arrests
Abstract
We study the impact of Ignition Interlock Laws (IILs), an increasingly popu-
lar public policy aimed at reducing drunk driving, on driving under the influence
(DUI) arrests. While past studies have found that IILs reduce alcohol-impaired
motor vehicle fatalities and short-term recidivism rates, little evidence exists on
how IILs impact DUI arrests as a more direct indicator of DUI prevalence. Using
state-level monthly panel data from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, we
find that DUI arrests decrease in response to IIL adoption, though more substan-
tively and significantly when all DUI offenders are required to use them for a pe-
riod after their conviction. The results suggest deterrence may be at least partially
responsible for this effect, contrary to what a previous analysis of motor vehicle
fatalities concluded. Our results add to the understanding of how IILs work, as
policy makers continue to address the over 100 million episodes of driving while
potentially under the influence of alcohol that are reported annually.1
Drunk driving continues to be a prevalent issue in the United States. Though mo-
tor vehicle fatalities decreased from 2016-2018, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration estimates that alcohol-impaired-driving led to 10,511 deaths in 2018.2
In 2010, the costs of mortality and other damages resulting from drunk driving were
estimated to be $44 billion.3 Because of the issue’s persistence, the magnitude of its
harmful effects, and the fact that a substantial share of these effects are negative exter-
nalities imposed on others, policymakers continually evaluate strategies for reducing
drunk driving and its adverse consequences.
Ignition interlock laws (IILs) have been promoted as a cost-effective measure to
combat drunk driving. These laws mandate the installation of an ignition interlock de-
vice in a vehicle after the driver has been convicted of a driving under the influence
(DUI) offense. Devices have a built-in breathalyzer into which a driver must blow to
start the ignition and periodically while driving to ensure their Blood Alcohol Con-
centration (BAC) is under the legal limit. Used as both a punishment and a deterrent,
IILs are an alternative to unequivocal license suspension for DUI offenses. While costs
differ across states, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, an enthusiastic proponent of IILs,
estimates that a device costs $70 to $150 to install and $60 to $80 per month for mon-
itoring and calibration.4 These costs are intended to be borne by drivers, though some
states offer financial assistance.
As a policy tool, IILs started slowly: after Iowa became the first to enact an IIL in
1997, it was nearly a decade before another state, New Mexico, followed suit in 2005.
However, the rate of adoption accelerated quickly thereafter. By 2018, 40 states and
the District of Columbia had implemented an IIL.
We follow the literature by categorizing IILs as either strong or weak. While strong
laws require all offenders to install a device upon conviction, weak laws tend to man-
1Walker acknowledges funding from the Public Policy Center at the University of Iowa and the Iowa
Center for Research by Undergraduates.
2See https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812826; an alcohol-impaired-driving
fatality is defined as a death resulting from a crash involving a driver with a blood alcohol concentration
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date devices only for first time offenders with a BAC of at least 0.08 and/or repeat
offenders. Sentencing length also varies across states, with device usage is typically
required for one to two years. Using this classification, 30 states and D.C. had enacted
a strong IIL by 2018.
Numerous studies have evaluated the effectiveness of IILs in reducing motor vehi-
cle accidents, fatalities, and recidivism. An early comprehensive review deemed only
two such studies on accidents to be reliable, with neither showing a significant effect
(Elder et al. 2011). Similarly, assessments of IILs in Sweden, Nova Scotia, and On-
tario provided no evidence that IILs influenced collision-related outcomes (Bjerre and
Thorsson 2008; Vanlaar et al. 2017; Wu et al. 2015). However, several later studies of
U.S. laws agree that IILs significantly reduce motor vehicle fatalities that are specif-
ically related to alcohol use (Carter et al. 2015; Fell and Lacey 2011; Kaufman and
Wiebe 2016; McGinty et al. 2017; Teoh et al. 2018; Ullman 2016).
In addition to decreasing alcohol-related motor vehicle fatalities, IILs have been
touted as a relatively inexpensive alternative for reducing DUI recidivism. All reviewed
analyses in Elder et al. (2011) report that ”interlocked” DUI offenders are less likely to
be arrested for a subsequent offense when compared to drivers without devices or with
license suspensions. However, these effects were no longer observed once the device
was removed from the vehicle (Bjerre and Thorsson 2008; Kerns 2017; McCartt et
al. 2013; Vanlaar et al. 2017; Willis et al. 2004). A controlled trial that attempted to
account for selection issues surrounding the type of person to choose a device over a
license suspension showed comparable results (Beck et al. 1999).
There is comparatively little evidence on whether IILs impact DUI arrests more
generally. To our knowledge, the only work on this question is from Soper (2020),
who in a two-way fixed effects analysis of annual state panel data from 2001-2016
found that DUI arrests did not significantly change in response to IIL implementation.
This paper likewise uses a difference-in-differences (DD) framework with state
panel data to estimate the causal impact of IIL adoption on DUI arrests. We extend the
Soper (2020) analysis by expanding the time period slightly and accounting for other
potential correlates of arrests rates that vary across states and time, such as other alco-
hol policies, labor market measures, and demographics. More substantively, we utilize
monthly rather than annual arrest data, which not only captures additional variation but
also enables more precise measurement of law implementation timing. Furthermore,
we pay special attention to the parallel trends assumption that validates DD models by
allowing for DUI arrests to trend both differentially and non-linearly by state, while
also restricting comparisons to geographically proximate states likely to be more in-
herently similar with each other even across dimensions that are difficult to measure.
Our preferred estimates, from regressions that include both state-specific cubic time
trends and year-by-Census division fixed effects, indicate that DUI arrests decline by
6.2% upon the adoption of a strong IIL. This effect varies little by gender (-6.2% for
males vs. -6.5% for females). Weak IILs also reduce arrests by a marginally significant
3.7%, although the impact is larger and more significant among males (4.4%) and in
recent years (7.9%). Strong laws passed more recently are also slightly more effective
(6.6% pre-2012 compared with 8.4% afterward).5 However, the fact that the magnitude
5As of January 1, 2012, 15 states had implemented strong IILs, half of the ultimate sample total of 30
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of the impact of strong IILs is not significantly larger over the second half of our sample
period, with the laws having been in place for longer and also becoming more prevalent,
is consistent with deterrence being at least partially responsible for explaining their
impact. This contrasts with the conclusion of Ullman (2016) for alcohol-related motor
vehicle fatalities, as an effect that is attributable purely to incapacitation would be
expected to increase over time.
An important caveat is that DUI arrests are not necessarily a direct reflection of
overall drunk driving behavior. DUI arrests depend critically on enforcement decisions
regarding resources devoted to DUI policing and the discretion used by the officers
involved. Additionally, DUI arrests represent only a small fraction of alcohol-impaired
driving episodes: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that only
about 1% of drunk drivers are arrested.6 Therefore, while we interpret our results as
implying that IILs have lowered the prevalence of driving under the influence, that
interpretation must be considered cautiously.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 1 provides background on the
behavioral models used to explain drunk driving behavior, section 2 describes our data
sources and methodology, section 3 presents our results, section 4 outlines robustness
tests, and section 5 discusses implications and concludes.
1 Background
As pointed out by Ullman (2016), deterrence theory has been assumed, sometimes ex-
plicitly but often implicitly, by most studies of drunk driving behavior. Based on the
framework of criminal behavior developed by Becker (1968), deterrence theory argues
that individuals are deterred from participating in criminal activities when the associ-
ated benefits are outweighed by the associated costs. Others, including Shavell (1987)
and Polinsky and Shavell (2007), have used incapacitation to model the optimal usage
of crime prevention measures. This model implies that the number of incapacitated
individuals increases with time as long as the cost of their incapacitation is less than
the cost of the harm they would cause in a free state. Miceli (2010, 2012) adapted the
standard economic model of crime to include both of these ideas, arguing for increases
(decreases) in the level of incapacitation when the deterrence level is low (high).
IILs could potentially affect drunk driving behavior through either or both of deter-
rence and incapacitation. The latter is straightforward, as driving under the influence
is impossible with a vehicle in which an ignition interlock device has been installed.
The prospect of being incapacitated in this way may also act as a deterrent to driving
after drinking in the future, as will explicit costs of installation and upkeep along with
implicit costs such as the likelihood that the device will reveal to family, friends, and
co-workers that the driver has been convicted of a DUI.
If incapacitation is the main reason that IILs decrease DUI arrests, then we would
expect effect magnitudes to rise as the number of individuals mandated to install inter-
lock devices increases. Therefore, the fact that our estimated effects for strong IILs,
plus D.C. Additionally, ignoring Iowa’s early implementation, 2012 equally separates the sample treatment
period.
6See https://www.cdc.gov/transportationsafety/impaired driving/impaired-drv factsheet.html
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Figure 1: Ignition Interlock Laws in 2008
which over time incapacitate more offenders and have steadily increased in presence,
are statistically the same in the first and second halves of the sample period provides
evidence that deterrence is at least partially responsible for their impact.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data Sources
We utilize information on IILs from the Mothers against Drunk Driving website (Driv-
ing 2013). Following the literature, IILs are classified as ”strong” when all DUI offend-
ers are mandated to install them and ”weak” otherwise (e.g. only for offenders with a
BAC above 0.08 or repeat offenders). As mentioned, adoption of IILs quickly became
widespread once New Mexico became the second state to establish one in 2005, with
40 states implementing an IIL by 2018, 31 of which are strong (with some states hav-
ing initially enacted a weak law that has since been strengthened). Despite the absence
of a state-wide law, we follow Ullman (2016) by including California in our treatment
group upon the implementation of their pilot program in four counties: Los Angeles,
Alameda, Sacramento, and Tulare7. Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate the pattern of IIL
law adoption across states by comparing the presence of IIL laws in 2008 and 2018,
respectively.
Information on DUI arrests from 1999 to 2018 comes from the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program (UCR) of the FBI. Florida is excluded from our sample because it
reports DUI arrest information only very rarely. Because other states have less extreme
reporting gaps varying from isolated months to several years, our panel is unbalanced.
Our threshold for including data from a particular state in a given sample month is a
7A statewide IIL became effective in California on January 1, 2019.
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Figure 2: Ignition Interlock Laws in 2018
specific percentage of the state’s population that is covered by the agencies reporting
data for that month. All estimates reported in the subsequent tables represent the av-
erage from nine regressions in which this threshold is varied from 50% to 90% at 5%
intervals. This strategy allows us to examine robustness of the results to incrementally
trading off data selectivity for sample size.8
Monthly demographics are calculated by interpolating annual population estimates
from the Census Bureau. Open container and 0.08 BAC drunk driving laws, along with
beer taxes, from the Alcohol Policy Information System are also included as control
variables. Table 1 displays summary statistics: a comparison of columns 1 and 2,
and likewise of columns 3 and 4, provides preliminary evidence that IIL presence is
negatively associated with DUI arrests. In general, we see that the control and treatment
groups in our sample are relatively similar. Nonetheless, as previously described, we
implement a DD framework that in our preferred specification allows DUI arrest rates
to have separate nonlinear trends in each state while also restricting comparisons to
states in the same U.S Census division.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
Our analysis examines the relationship between IILs and DUI arrests in a panel data
framework, allowing us to control for factors common to both states and time that
influence both DUI arrests and IIL implementation. State fixed effects account for po-
tentially conflating factors that vary slowly over time within each state, while month-
by-year fixed effects (i.e. separate indicators for each month of each year) do the same
for month-to-month temporal variation that affects all states. The two-way state and
8Our main effect for strong IILs is significant at the 1% level for all nine inclusion thresholds; the effect
of weak IILs is significant at the 10% level at seven of the nine thresholds.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-treat (Strong) Post-treat (Strong) Pre-treat (Weak) Post-treat (Weak) Control
DUI Arrests (per 100,000) 42.18 31.87 41.07 23.13 35.74
Youth (6-20) % .2141 .1983 .2102 .2051 .2080
Adult (21-61) % .5579 .5518 .5541 .5474 .5521
Old (62+) % .1456 .1730 .1564 .1678 .1617
Hispanic % .1883 .2221 .1214 .1813 .0596
Black % .1303 .1236 .1422 .1380 .1484
Male % .4925 .4936 .4907 .4931 .4896
Income ($1000) 36.93 49.61 36.60 44.04 38.83
Note: All estimates are weighted by state-year population.
month-by-year fixed effects regression compares, from month to month, the change in
DUI arrests for states that implemented an IIL that month with the change in arrests
over the same period in states that either already or do not have an IIL. The DD es-
timator from this model reflects the average of these comparisons across all sample
months, allowing us to causally interpret the estimated average effect of IILs imple-
mented across states and time.
Our analysis estimates variations of the following model:
log(Dsm) = β0 +β1Ssm +β2Wsm +β3Xsm +β4Zsm +λs +λm +βtTs +λdy + εsm
where s and m denote state and sample month, respectively and Dsm denotes DUI ar-
rests. Ssm = 1 if a strong IIL is in effect in that state for the entire month and Wsm = 1 is
the same for a weak ILL, meaning that the initial month of adoption is considered un-
treated unless the law became effective on the 1st of the month. We include state fixed
effects (λs) and sample month fixed effects (λm) to account for factors that are constant
within states over time and that vary over time similarly across states, respectively.
To increase statistical precision and at least partially account for the possibility that
IIL implementation represents a broader effort by the state to combat drinking and
driving, we include as regressors Xsm the alcohol policy measures described above as
well as socioeconomic factors (race/ethnicity, gender, age, per capita income, the un-
employment rate, and log population). Specifying log population as a control variable
performs the dual purpose of standardizing arrests by population while also allowing
arrest rates themselves to depend on population size. Zsm represents various additional
covariates inserted to test for robustness and mechanisms, upon which we elaborate
after presenting the main results.
All regressions are weighted by the average state population over the sample period
so that estimates reflect predicted effects across individuals rather than states. Standard
errors are clustered by state to allow for within-state serial correlation in unobserved
DUI arrest determinants. Our estimates of interest are β1 and β2; given the logged
dependent variable, these represents the average percentage increases in the DUI arrest
rate resulting from enacting strong and weak IILs, respectively.
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3 Results
Our DD estimates for the responsiveness of DUI arrests rates to IIL adoption are sum-
marized in Table 2. Moving across columns reveals the importance of including two-
way fixed effects to implement the DD design (column 2), state-specific cubic time
trends to allow for DUI arrest rates to trend nonlinearly and differentially in each state
(column 3), and division-by-sample month fixed effects to restrict comparisons to geo-
graphically proximate and thus intrinsically similar states (column 4). In particular, the
notable reduction in both effect sizes and standard errors appears to justify the strategy
of explicitly modeling the nonlinearity in state DUI arrest trends.
Our preferred specification in column 4 shows that adopting IILs predicts DUI ar-
rest rate declines of 6.2% for strong laws and 3.7% for weak laws. It is not surprising
that strong laws, by virtue of covering first time and/or relatively low BAC offenders
to whom some weak laws do not apply, have larger effects, although the difference be-
tween the coefficients is not statistically significant. Moreover, statistical significance
is high for strong laws, with an absolute t-statistic of well over 3, but only at 10% for
weak laws. It should be noted, however, that in column 3, in which the weak IIL ef-
fect is actually slightly smaller in magnitude, the standard error is disproportionately
smaller to the extent that the effect becomes significant at the 5% level.
Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong IIL -.0594 -.0962* -.0637*** -.0622**
(.0713) (.0457) (.0157) (.0182)
Weak IIL -.0145 -.0843* -.0357* -.0372+
(.0719) (.0377) (.0169) (.0189)
Demographics X X X X
Labor market X X X X
Alcohol policies X X X X
State FE X X X
Sample month FE X X
State cubic trends X X
Division-by-sample month FE X
Note: +:p < .1, *:p < .05, **:p < .01, ***:p < .001. Regressions are weighted by state population, with standard errors
clustered by state. The dependent variable is the natural log of DUI arrests. Demographic variables include the natural logs
of the population covered by the state’s reporting agency, the state’s overall population, and the fraction of residents who
are male, youth (ages 6-20), adult (ages 21-61), elderly (ages 62+), Black, and Hispanic. Labor market measures include
the unemployment rate and per capita personal income. Alcohol policies include the beer tax along with indicators for the
presence of open container and 0.08 BAC drunk driving laws. Estimates are an average of nine models in which inclusion
of data from a specific state-month cell is determined by the percentage of a state’s population covered by the reporting
agencies that month, with the threshold for inclusion varying from 50% to 90% in increments of 5%.
Although rates of alcohol use in general, and DUI arrests in particular, are some-
what higher for males than females, Table 3 shows that the average effect of strong
laws is quite similar across genders. In contrast, weak laws on average lower DUI
arrest rates by a significant 4.4% for males, but an insignificant 1.7% for females.
We also split our sample period in Table 3 to investigate whether law effectiveness
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changed once they became more widespread.9 If incapacitation was responsible for
the effect of IIL implementation, we should see an increase in effect size. For strong
laws, while the effect is slightly larger in later years, the difference is not statistically
significant, with the estimates being well within a standard error of each other. This
suggests that deterrence is at least partially responsible for the impact strong IILs have
on reducing DUI arrests. This conclusion is contrary to that of Ullman (2016), who
finds that incapacitation is largely responsible for a decrease in alcohol-related motor-
vehicle fatalities after strong IIL implementation. In contrast, the effect of weak laws
is close to zero in early years, but grows to near the size of the strong law effect and
becomes highly significant in later years.
Table 3: Secondary Results
Male DUIs Female DUIs Time Periods
Strong IIL -.0618** -.0647**
(.0182) (.0195)










Note: +:p < .1, *:p < .05, **:p < .01, ***:p < .001. Regressions represent the preferred model from column 4 of Table
2 and are weighted by state population, with standard errors clustered by state. The dependent variable is the natural log
of DUI arrests. Estimates are an average of nine models in which inclusion of data from a specific state-month cell is
determined by the percentage of a state’s population covered by the reporting agencies that month, with the threshold for
inclusion varying from 50% to 90% in increments of 5%.
4 Robustness Tests
As one attempt to test whether the estimated effects might somehow be picking up
other factors that changed coincidentally with law implementation, we add lead and
lag terms to our preferred specification. Table 4 shows that none of the eight 12- and
24-month lead and lag terms for the two law types are significant at 5%. For both strong
and weak laws, the 12-month lead term has the largest coefficient among the four leads
and lags, suggesting an anticipatory effect that could be consistent with deterrence.
9The year 2012 was chosen because 15 states had enacted a strong IIL by December 2011, about half of
the 31 states (including D.C.) that had done so by the end of the sample period.
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Table 4: Timing of Effect
Pre-24 months Pre-12 months Post-12 months Post-24 months
Strong IIL .0010 −.0305+ .0008 .0141
(.0198) (.0162) (.0286) (.0229)
Weak IIL -.0087 -.0220 -.0072 -.0060
(.0287) (.0265) (.0266) (.0365)
Note: +:p < .1, *:p < .05, **:p < .01, ***:p < .001. Regressions represent the preferred model from column 4 of Table
2 and are weighted by state population, with standard errors clustered by state. The dependent variable is the natural log
of DUI arrests. Estimates are an average of nine models in which inclusion of data from a specific state-month cell is
determined by the percentage of a state’s population covered by the reporting agencies that month, with the threshold for
inclusion varying from 50% to 90% in increments of 5%.
Other possible explanations for a decrease in DUI Arrests being spuriously corre-
lated with IIL implementation are simultaneously occurring declines in overall crimi-
nal behavior or a more widespread increase in enforcement behavior. We test these hy-
potheses by estimating our preferred specification but with the log of arrests for stealing
and gambling, also recorded by the Uniform Crime Reporting program, substituted as
dependent variables in place of DUI arrests. Table 5 indicates that while effect sizes
are similar for weak IILs and actually larger for strong IILs on gambling arrests, signs
are inconsistent, while standard errors are sufficiently large to render the relationships
statistically insignificant. These results cast doubt on the possibility that IIL adoption
is systematically associated with changes in criminal activity or enforcement intensity
more generally.
Table 5: Other Criminal Outcomes
DUI Arrests Stealing Arrests Gambling Arrests
Strong IIL .0622** -.0030 .1346
(.0182) (.0336) (.0804)
Weak IIL .0372+ .0347 -.0470
(.0189) (.0409) (.1223)
Note: +:p < .1, *:p < .05, **:p < .01, ***:p < .001. Regressions represent the preferred model from column 4 of Table
2 and are weighted by state population, with standard errors clustered by state. The dependent variable is the natural log
of DUI arrests. Estimates are an average of nine models in which inclusion of data from a specific state-month cell is
determined by the percentage of a state’s population covered by the reporting agencies that month, with the threshold for
inclusion varying from 50% to 90% in increments of 5%.
5 Discussion
Our analysis finds that IILs reduce DUI arrests, with strong laws being particularly
effective. DD estimates show that strong IIL adoption predicts a subsequent decline of
6.2% in the DUI arrest rate.
Regarding plausibility, this effect size seems consistent with the number of ignition
interlock devices in use nationally. In 2014, the most recent year for which data are
available, the estimated number of devices installed in states that reported data was
318,714, or about 10.1 per 10,000 residents; in states with strong laws in 2014, 135,899
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devices were installed.10 Based on this count, our estimated effect of 6.2% implies that
strong IILs averted about 41,199 DUI arrests in 2014, suggesting an upper bound of
roughly 0.3 DUI arrests avoided for every device installed. As a first approximation,
this seems reasonable given that every device represents a driver who has already been
convicted of a DUI offense.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the impact of
IILs on DUI arrests using monthly arrest data, controlling for correlates of arrest rates
across time and states, and explicitly modeling temporal and spatial relationships in an
effort to ensure that the parallel trends assumption of the DD framework is satisfied.
We estimate a causal effect of strong IILs that is statistically and economically signif-
icant, yet plausible in size. Our results provide additional evidence of the effects of
IILs beyond their impact on fatal accidents, further highlighting their usefulness as a
potential contributor toward mitigating societal harm from drunk driving.
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